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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 880269-CA
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ALLEN DWAINE OLSEN, MICHAEL
PAYNE WARWICK and DONALD RAY
HATCH,

Category No. 2

Defendants-Appellants.
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants reassert and rely upon the
facts as set forth in the Appellants1 brief and Respondent's
brief previously filed in this case.
REPLY POINT I
THE PROSECUTION HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE INCULPATORY ORAL
STATEMENTS OF EACH DEFENDANT
The State has responded that because counsel for Defendants
made no specific written requests for disclosure of Defendants1
oral statements, it was proper for the prosecution to withhold
information as to the existence and substance of Defendants' oral
statements. In reply, Defendants assert that such disclosure was
required both by Section 77-35-l6(a) (1) and by the holdings of
the Utah Supreme Court.
Section 77-35-l6(a)(1) requires the prosecution - on request
-to disclose

ff

[r]elevant written or recorded statements of the

defendant or co-defendants[.]" Requests for disclosure of each
Defendants statements were made by both defense counsel who each
couched their requests substantially in the exact wording of the
statute. In his RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY the prosecutor
1

responded to Defendants1 requests for statements by stating
"[t]he Wayne County Prosecutor has no knowledge of any written or
recorded statements of the Defendants." Later, at a pre-trial
suppression hearing the prosecutor disclosed an oral statement by
Defendant, Hatch (transcript of suppression hearing, page 39); in
opening argument he made reference to a purported oral admission
of guilt by Defendant Michael Warwick (T. 15); and during the
testimony of a Wayne County Deputy Sheriff he attempted to
introduce a purported oral statement attributed to Defendant,
Olsen (T.91).
The State's trial and appellate counsel have each sought to
justify such non-disclosures based on a strict interpretation of
the Section's reference to only "written and recorded statements"
and on Defendants' adoption of the statutory language without
additional

specific references to oral statements in their

respective requests. Appellate counsel has cited several cases
from other jurisdictions in support of the State's position but
none from Utah. Defendants have likewise been unable to discover
Utah cases directly on point. The State has further argued on
appeal that, at any rate, it would
prosecutors

to have to disclose

be too burdensome
the oral

statements

for
of

defendants.
Defendants here argue that this Court should rule that
inculpatory oral statements fall within the meaning and intent of
Section

77-35-16(a)(1 ) and that any relevant

statements by defendants

- written, recorded,
2

inculpatory
memorized,

characterized, or paraphrased - be disclosed upon proper and
timely request. Such a ruling would place no additional burden on
a prosecutor

who intends to preserve an inculpatory oral

statement for his own use - as in this case - and would promote
the openness and fairness on which the criminal justice system is
founded.
A ruling that a remembered oral statement does not fall
within the parameters of the statute would promote no purpose
other than to condone knowing and purposeful withholding of
critical evidence, would encourage police and prosecutors to
refrain from recording statements in order to hide them from
defense counsel and would reward bad faith and gamesmanship.
The intent of this Section is to require full disclosure
upon request, not to provide a place for prosecutors to hide
evidence by splitting hairs. This court should rule that the
inculpatory oral statements that the prosecutor sought to use in
this matter fell within the meaning and intent of the Section and
that a duty existed to disclose both the existence and substance
of the statements. This Court should not legitimize the
intentional hiding of material evidence exemplified by this case.
If this Court rules that oral statements don't fall within
Section 77-35-l6(a)(1) the Court should nevertheless find that
they fall within Section 77-35-l6(a)(5) and that principals
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court required their disclosure.
The State correctly points out that the Utah Supreme Court in
State v Knight, 734 P.2d 913, promulgated the following rule:
3

[W]hen the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily
to a request under subsection (a)(5) without requiring
the defense to obtain a court order, considerations of
fairness require that the prosecution respond to the
request in a manner that will not be misleading.
[T]he prosecution either must produce all of the
material requested or must identify explicitly those
portions of the request with respect to which no
responsive material will be provided. Knight, supra.
In an earlier case the Supreme Court held that
even though there is no court-ordered disclosure,
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered
inculpatory information which falls within the gambit
of [Section] 77-35-l6(a), after the prosecution has
made a voluntary disclosure of evidence might so
mislead the defendant as to cause prejudicial error.
State v Carter, 707 P.2d 656.
As the State has indicated, at a pre-trial suppression
hearing the prosecution asked its witness to relate an oral
statement made by Defendant, Hatch and Hatch's counsel, Mr.
Esplin, objected citing the prosecution's previous negative
response to the request

for Defendants' statements. The

prosecutor responded "Your request was 'any written or recorded
statements'. There are statements of the defendants that were
made to the officers. And I denied there were any others. We
don't have any." The objection was overruled and the witness
responded, "Mr. Hatch replied, 'I don't know.'" (Transcript of
Suppression Hearing at page 39.)
Although not voluntarily disclosed in the strictest since of
that word, the oral statement of one of the Defendants was
disclosed by the prosecutor, through the testimony of his own
witness at pre-trial hearing. His ambiguous response to counsel's

4

objection coupled with the denial in paragraph 1 of his written
response to the two requests for discovery implied no other oral
statements existed either from this Defendant or from the other
two Defendants. The

harm

resulting

from

this

type

of

misrepresentation or misunderstanding was addressed by the Court
in Knight which noted that it
has the effect of representing to the defense that
the evidence does not exist. In reliance on this
misleading representation, the defense might abandon
lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.
Knight, supra, citing United States v Bagley, 473 US

GUT?
This Court should carefully scrutinize the issue of the
prosecutor's duty of disclosure raised in this case. It involves
evidence that was unquestionably critical to a fair and complete
defense of the charges; it involves

Defendants' right of

confrontation; it involves information bearing directly on the
ethical responsibilities of one of the defense counsel who was
representing two of the Defendants jointly; retention of the
information served no compelling State interest; it was obviously
purposefully withheld; it was withheld despite two separate,
timely, good faith requests for its disclosure; it involves a
question of apparent first impression; it is central to the
criminal justice system which the Utah Supreme Court has said f'is
a real quest for truth and not simply a contest between the
parties to win", Knight, supra. But most importantly, the
withholding of the information violated Defendants' rights to a
fair trial and due process.

5

Defendants urge that since they had requested disclosure of
statements made by each of the Defendants, since the prosecutor
denied the existence of written or recorded statements while
failing to explicitly and clearly identify that he had knowledge
of oral statements or that he intended not to disclose them, and
since he ultimately disclosed one of the oral statements but
concealed the others, the underlying principals of Knight and
Carter controlled here and required that the prosecutor disclose
all oral statements rather than just one. Defendants further urge
that his failure to do so mislead the Defendants as to the
existence and substance of the additional oral statements,
dissuaded them from pursuing legitimate

lines of defense,

investigation, and trial strategy, and violated the principal
stated in Knight, Bagley, and Carter that he make full disclosure
or explicitly and specifically identify those portions of the
request to which he would not respond.
REPLY POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATION OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE ORAL
STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANTS AND HIS REFERENCE IN HIS OPENING
STATEMENT TO A NON-DISCLOSED ORAL STATEMENT OF A DEFENDANT WAS
IMPROPER AND WAS NOT HARMLESS
This [Supreme] Court has adopted a two-part test
for determining whether a prosecutor's remark warrants
reversal: (1) did the remarks call to the attention of
the jurors matters which they could not properly
consider in determining their verdict, and (2) were the
jurors under the circumstances of the particular case
probably influenced by those remarks. State v Tucker,
727 P.2d 185, citing State v Smith, 700 P.2d 1106,
State v Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, and State v Bailey, 712
P.2d 281. See also State v Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, State v
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, State v Tillman, 750 P.2d 54b, and
State v Gardner, 101 P.2d 3.

6

In his opening statement, State's counsel told the jury that
a deputy Wayne County Sheriff would testify that Defendant
Warwick stated after his arrest and after being advised that he
would have to appear at the justice of the peace to be officially
advised of the charges, "We are not going through all that
rigmarole ... I'm guilty and I know it." (T. 15) The jury could
not properly have considered this evidence for two reasons;
first, this statement was improperly withheld from Defendants in
spite of timely and proper written request for disclosure and in
spite of the prosecutors duty to disclose it, as has been argued
elsewhere herein; and second, because it violated the other
Defendants' rights of confrontation as interpreted in Bruton v
United States, 391 US 123.
The State has argued that the Bruton principal does not
apply to this statement for the reason that Warwick's statement
does not demonstrate his co-defendants' guilt. As authority, the
State cites State v Ellis & Withers, 748 P.2d 188. In Ellis the
two defendants were found in a car near a crime scene apparently
sleeping. When asked what they were doing they gave inconsistent
statements about the length of time they had been in the car and
about how long the car had been parked at that location. The
Supreme Court rightfully concluded thatThese factually inconsistent statements reflect
each defendant's efforts to exculpate himself. They
certainly support an inference that one or both were
not telling the truth about how long the car had been
parked, but they do not rise to the level of directly
implicating either defendant in the crime charged.
Therefore, Bruton does not come in to play, and the
trial court was not compelled to sever the trials or
7

exclude the testimony. E l l i s , supra.
In c o n t r a s t , Warwick's purported statement i s a d i r e c t and
unequivocal

admission of g u i l t of the crime charged,

spoken by one of t h r e e o c c u p a n t s of a t r u c k
trailer

full

of a l l e g e d l y

stolen c a t t l e .

allegedly

towing an open

As such,

i t was "a

powerfully and f a c i a l l y incriminating" statement with respect to
a l l t h r e e occupants of the truck and d i r e c t l y implicated each of
the occupants of the v e h i c l e . As such i t was r i g h t f u l l y

excluded

by the t r i a l court under the p r i n c i p a l s of Bruton and was not a
matter t h a t the jury could have properly considered.
The second prong of t h e p r o s e c u t o r i a l
meant t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r
influenced

the

improper

the jury in t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n .

the p r o s e c u t o r f s

misconduct t e s t
remarks

probably

In other words, was

e r r o r h a r m l e s s . The Utah Supreme Court

defined the "reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y " of a more favorable
as one t h a t undermines the c o u r t ' s c o n f i d e n c e
Knight,

supra,

as opposed t o an e r r o r

inconsequential

that

likelihood

the

that

proceedings."
Knight,
disclose

we c o n c l u d e
error

affected

S t a t e v Verde,

t h e Court

ruled

the

is

no

has

result

outcome,

"sufficiently
reasonable

outcome

of

the

101 Utah Advance Reports 37. In

that

in c a s e s

inculpatory evidence,

c r e d i b l e argument t h a t

in t h e

t h a t was

there

is

involving

once t h e defendant

t h e defense

failure

to

has made a

has been impaired by t h e

p r o s e c u t o r ' s e r r o r s , the S t a t e has the burden of persuading the
a p p e l l a t e court t h a t there was not a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable v e r d i c t for the defendant, absent the e r r o r . This
8

assessment is made with an eye toward the totality of the trial,
Speer, supra.
The State has acknowledged that the only issue in this
matter for the jury to consider was whether the Defendants knew,
or should have known, that the cattle were owned rather than
wild, and whether the Defendants therefore had an intent to
deprive the owner of his/her property. It is undisputed that the
cattle were taken from an unfenced and unmarked grazing allotment
consisting of over 200,000 acres situated on public lands open to
public ingress and egress and that the grazing area is one of
only three in the state that is grazed year-round; that the
cattle bore no outward marks of ownership or husbandry such as
brands, tatoos, or earmarks, and that they weren't castrated nor
were their horns cut. The Defendants were transporting the cattle
in an open trailer during daylight hours over a route that passed
directly by a BLM ranger station. The only road into and out of
the area where the cattle were taken bore no signs of maintenance
or passage. Defendant Hatch testified that the three Defendants
observed no signs of ownership or regular human activity in the
area such litter, vehicle tracks, salt licks, water, feed, or
horse tracks.

He did not deny being in possession of the animals

nor that he had come to the area with the specific intent of
rounding up and removing cattle. He testified, however, that had
they seen any sign of ownership

on any cattle

they saw-

including those they didn't catch - they would not have taken any
of the animals.
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Although the court did not allow the prosecutor to introduce
the non-disclosed oral statements in its case in chief (T.50) it
did allow that the statements could be used in rebuttal (T.91).
Consequently, in an effort to minimize the damage that would have
been caused by introduction of the purported oral admissions in
rebuttal, neither Defendants Warwick nor Olsen testified in
corroboration of Defendant Hatch's testimony.
The jury deliberated for more than three hours presumably on
the single issue of intent. Clearly, Defendants' credibility was
critical to their defense that they had no knowledge that the
cattle were owned and that they therefore had no intent to
deprive the owner of his property. And clearly their defense was
impaired by the prosecution's failure to disclose the various
oral statements and his improper reference in opening argument to
a purported contrary admission of guilt by one of the Defendants.
The impairment was to the credibility of the Defendant Hatch who
did testify as to the Defendants' lack of intent as well as to
the effect on Defendants Warwick's and Olsen's decision not to
testify in corroboration thereof.
The withholding

of requested

evidence

also

affected

Defendants' pre-trial strategy and preparation. Had the oral
statements been discovered and had the Defendants denied the
statements, defense counsel would have had time to investigate to
determine the credibility of the declarants and to develope
contradicting

evidence.

If Defendants

had

admitted

the

statements, trial might probably have been avoided. With prior
10

knowledge of the purportedly incriminating statements counsel
would have been alerted to the need to move to suppress, severe,
and probably withdraw from joint representation of both Warwick
and 01sen.
Defendants have made a credible argument that their defense
was impaired by the prosecutor's misconduct
misconduct

and that the

was not so inconsequential that this court can

conclude there was no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of
the trial was thereby effected. As evidence that there was not a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome

for the

Defendants, absent such misconduct, the State has merely stated,
as a conclusion, that there was "evidence of defendants1 guilt".
However, the improper comment did not merely add more weight to
the circumstantial evidence the jury was about to consider, nor
was it merely

cumulative or a repetition of otherwise admissable

evidence. Rather, it constituted

the only source of such

admission, directly contradicted the only defensive theory, and
undermined the Defendants1 credibility which was critical to such
defense. The State's burden under Knight in this regard is not to
show that there was evidence in support of the verdict but to
show that the misconduct did not have a substantial effect on the
verdict. The State has not and can not do so in light of the
defense put forth and the directly contradictory nature of the
inadmissable oral statement referenced by the prosecutor in his
opening statement. This Court should therefore conclude that the
State has failed to establish that the prosecutor's misconduct
11

did not substantially influence the outcome of the trial, that
such improper influence undermines confidence in the verdict, and
that the judgment based thereon should be reversed.
REPLY POINT III
DEFENDANTS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO RELIEF FROM THE
PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THEIR ORAL STATEMENTS AND FROM
THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT
The State has argued that Defendants have waived their right
to challenge any claims of violation of the prosecutor's duty to
disclose and of prosecutorial misconduct for three reasons:
first,

Defendants

didn't

specifically

request

the

oral

statements; second, Defense counsel knew of or should have been
able to learn of the existence and substance of the oral
statements without need for disclosure by the State; and, third,
Defendants did not seek proper relief for the claimed errors at
the trial level.
Defendants' reply to the first reason is stated elsewhere
herein.
As to the second reason, the State points to two sources
from which defense counsel should have known about the oral
statements later used against them. The first was Sheriff Ekker.
The second was the prosecutor.
Both State trial and appellate counsel hint that Sheriff
Ekker advised defense counsel of Defendants' oral admissions on
the day of the preliminary examination (8 September, 1987),
although no record is referred to in support of the claims.
Without admitting such disclosure but assuming, arguendo, that
12

reference to such admissions was made by the Sheriff as claimed,
it should be noted that both defense counsel filed proper written
requests for discovery within a few weeks of the preliminary
examination. Such requests would have been the reasonable and
proper response to the Sheriff's purported advice in order that
the prosecutor could verify the existence of the statements and
specify which Defendant said what to whom. Any clues to the
statements that might have been gained from the Sheriff were
cooled

by the prosecutor's subsequent misleading negative

response to the requests for disclosure.
The second purported collateral source of the statements was
the prosecutor himself. He and appellate counsel claim disclosure
was made in the response to the requests for discovery and at the
suppression hearing.
As elsewhere noted, the written response to the requests for
discovery clearly gives no overt indication of the existence or
substance of any oral statements.
A review of the transcript of the suppression

hearing

reveals that only one reference was made to oral statements (page
39). It came in response to and addressed an objection to an
attempt to introduce a specific oral statement from Defendant,
Hatch. It is cryptic in its purported

reference

to other

statements. It reveals the substance of only the one statement
from Defendant, Hatch, and no others. In it the prosecutor
states, "I denied there were any others. We don't have any." It's
evident from the pattern of the prosecutor's written and oral
13

responses that his intent was to conceal rather than to reveal
the oral statements. The State cannot claim it has disclosed
information that it has hidden in a maze of obstructive and
misleading statements.
Thirdly, the State has asserted that Defendants failed to
make

a timely effort to obtain relief from the prosecutor's

misconduct, specifically, that defense counsel did not move for
continuance or mistrial. The State notes the Utah Supreme Court's
recognition of the timely motions of defense counsel in Knight as
opposed to the failure of defense counsel to make such motions in
State v Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879. However, in Griffiths the Court
found that defense counsel was made aware of

defendant's

statements in advance of trial and nevertheless failed to seek a
continuance to investigate. Whereas, in this matter, despite the
claims of the State, defense counsel had no prior knowledge of
the purported statements of Defendants Warwick and Olsen until
the prosecutor disclosed one in opening statement and another
during testimony at trial, after a jury had been impanelled.
Defendants therefore had no reasonable opportunity to seek a pretrial continuance to investigate as in Griffiths.
Further, immediately upon hearing the prosecutor's reference
to the purported statements in the opening argument, defense
counsel sought a bench conference, an instruction to refrain from
further improper comment by the prosecutor, and an exclusion of
the statement from evidence. While the trial court instructed the
prosecutor

to make no more reference to the statement and
14

excluded it from the State's case in chief, the court indicated
the statement would be allowed for rebuttal purposes. Defendants
did seek immediate relief which was granted in part and denied in
part.

Finally, the State seems to cite Griffiths for the

proposition that the only relief that should be sought for
prosecutorial misconduct is either a continuance or a mistrial.
Although the Court indicated Griffiths' counsel could

have

mitigated damage by seeking a continuance, the case does not hold
that a continuance or mistrial is the only proper form of relief
in all situations. The exigencies of each case should dictate the
proper

form of relief. While the defendants in Knight and

Griffiths may have been well served by a continuance or
declaration of mistrial, that does not mean that all defendants
in all cases are similarly well served by such relief.
In this matter a two-day trial was held in Loa. Defendants
resided in Emery and Carbon Counties. Defense counsel resided and
practiced in Provo. The trial judge sat in Sanpete County and had
jurisdiction over several counties. The trial was set some five
months after the alleged crime to comport with the trial court's
unusual schedule. The prosecutor practiced in Richfield. The
trial constituted a great expense to Defendants due to the need
for them, their families, and their counsel to appear and defend
away from their homes and offices. A continuance or rescheduling
of the trial would have necessitated further financial burden and
would have effectively constituted a waiver of speedy trial due
to the trial court's extended territorial responsibilities and
15

consequential
relief

time r e s t r i c t i o n s .

may be p r e f e r r e d

While a p a r t i c u l a r

and proper

would r e s u l t in no untoward hardship on the

in

circumstances

Defendants

to

seek

it

was

exclusion

proper
of

the

and

defendant,

reasonable

evidence

rather

that

court denies the r e l i e f

denial

requested

under

Rule

for
than

continuance or m i s t r i a l . And, as the Court in Knight s t a t e d ,
the t r i a l

of

in a s e t t i n g where delay of

the t r i a l
these

form

"if

16(g),

may c o n s t i t u t e an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n warranting a

reversal."
This Court should rule that Defendants took all appropriate
steps under the circumstances of the case to mitigate and
preserve their right to appeal from the damage done by the
prosecutor's failure to disclose and improper conduct in opening
statement. The matter should be reversed by reason of the
prosecutor's errors and the trial court's abuse of discretion in
refusing to exclude the oral statements of the Defendants Warwick
and Olsen in the State's rebuttal as well as in its case in
chief.
REPLY POINT IV
THE STATE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH REASONABLE MINDS COULD HAVE FOUND DEFENDANTS GUILTY
Defendants resisted the charge of cattle theft asserting
they came to the area for the admitted purpose of rounding up the
cattle, but claiming they took them under the reasonable and
mistaken belief that they were wild. There defense was founded on
Section 76-2-304, Utah Code.
The State, in its responsive brief, has countered that the
16

jury had substantial evidence before it from which it could have
reasonably concluded that on other dates, other persons saw
indications of ownership on other cattle, somewhere within the
200,000+ acre expanse of the owner's grazing allotment. The State
also points to evidence that - not surprisingly - the Sheriff and
his cousin A.C. Ekker, the actual owner if the cattle, did not
believe the Defendants didn't know the cattle were owned.
The State does not dispute, however, that the cattle in
question bore absolutely no outward signs of ownership, that the
area from which they were taken gave no other indication that the
cattle were owned or managed, that Defendant, Hatch was truthful
in his testimony that the Defendants took great care to be sure
none of the cattle they encountered that day bore signs of
ownership and that the cattle had a wild and untended appearance,
or that the Defendants made no attempts to conceal their admitted
purpose to gather the cattle. Essentially, the State has pointed
to no evidence that would support the jury's concluding against
the Defendants' claim of mistake of fact, as opposed to evidence
that other persons on other dates, saw other cattle, at other
locations, that did carry brands. The jury had no evidence before
it - except for the inadmissable purported admission of Michael
Warwick, improperly stated by the prosecutor - from which it
could have reasonably concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the Defendants were not acting under a reasonable mistake of fact
when they took the cattle.
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CONCLUSION
In summation, counsel for Defendants-Appellants reaffirm the
prosecution had a duty to disclose the inculpatory oral
statements of each defendant.
violation

In addition, the prosecutor's

of the duty to disclose the oral statements of

Defendants and his reference in his opening statement to a nondisclosed oral statement of a Defendant was improper and was not
harmless.

Further, Defendants did not waive their right to

relief from the prosecutor's failure to disclose their oral
statements and from the prosecutor's misconduct.

Finally, the

State has not established that there was evidence from which
reasonable minds could have found Defendants guilty.
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CRIMINAL CODE

as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a
later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant
was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the
defendant to the jury at trial. Any order by the court
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be appealable by the state.
(6) In a n y hearing before a judge or jury where t h e
defense of entrapment is a n issue, past offenses of the
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial
where t h e defendant testifies he may be asked of his
past convictions for felonies a n d any testimony given
by t h e defendant a t a hearing on entrapment may be
used to impeach his testimony a t trial.
1973
76-2-304. I g n o r a n c e o r mistake of fact o r l a w .
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state
is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence
or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime
unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor
reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the
actor's reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by
law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law
contained in an opinion of a court of record or
made by a public servant charged by law
with responsibility for interpreting the law
in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of
fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser
included offense of which he would be guilty if the
fact or law were as he believed.
1974
76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a defense.
(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnaping, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; rape of a child,
a violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; sodomy upon
a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; or sexual
abuse of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-404.1; or
an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that the
actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 years of
age or older at the time of the alleged offense or was
unaware of the victim's true age.
(2) It is not a defense to t h e crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, a violation of Section 76-5-401, or an
attempt to commit that crime, that the actor mistakenly believed t h e victim to be 16 years of age or older
at t h e time of t h e alleged offense or was unaware of
the victim's true age.
1983
76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense —
Influence of alcohol or other substance
voluntarily consumed — Definition.
n \ ft is a defense to a prosecution under any stat-

76-2-401

element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not
otherwise a defense.
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the
defenses known as "insanity" and "diminished mental capacity."
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental illness.
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect. A mental defect may be a congenital condition or
one the result of injury or a residual effect of a physical or mental disease. Mental illness does not mean a
personality or character disorder or abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct.
1986
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the
existence of the mental state which is an element of
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the
actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
1973
76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts prior
to offense.
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in
which an actor's criminal responsibility arises from
his own conduct or from being a party to an offense
under Section 76-2-201 [76-2-202] that prior to the
commission of the offense, the actor voluntarily terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission and either:
(1) Gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities or the intended victim; or
(2) Wholly deprives h i s prior efforts of effectiveness in t h e commission.
1973
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses.
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affirmative defenses.
1973
PART 4
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Section
76-2-401.
76-2-402.
76-2-403.
76-2-404.
76-2-405.
76-2-406.

Justification as defense — When allowed.
Force in defense of person — Forcible
felony defined.
Force in arrest.
Peace officer's use of deadly force.
Force in defense of habitation.
Force in defense of property.

76-2-401. Justification as defense — When allowed.
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense based on the conduct. The defense
of justification may be claimed:
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of
persons or property under the circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of
this part;
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and
;~ f.,ifiiim«»nt. of his duties as a governmental of-
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that persons operating the closed circuit equipment film both the child and the defendant during the child's testimony, so that the jury may
view both the child and the defendant, if that
may be arranged without violation of other requirements of Subsection (2)
(3) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse
or of a sexual offense against a child, the court may
order, upon motion of the prosecution and for good
cause shown, that the testimony of any witness or
victim younger than 14 years of age be taken outside
the courtroom and be recorded That testimony is admissible as evidence, for viewing in any court proceeding regarding the charges if the provisions of
Subsection (2) are observed, in addition to the following provisions
(a) the recording is both visual and aural and
recorded on film or videotape or by other electronic means,
(b) the recording equipment is capable of making an accurate recording, the operator is competent, and the recording is accurate and is not altered,
(c) each voice on the recording is identified,
and
(d) each party is given an opportunity to view
the recording before it is shown in the courtroom
(4) If the court orders that the testimony of a child
be taken under Subsection (2) or (3), the child may
not be required to testify in court at any proceeding
where the recorded testimony is used
1968
77-35-16. Rule 16 — Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor
shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge
(L) Relevant written or recorded statements of
the defendant or co-defendants,
(2) The criminal record of the defendant,
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant,
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree
of the offense for reduced punishment, and
(6) Any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as
soon as practicable following the filing of charges and
before the defendant is required to plead The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged,
the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor
to adequately prepare his case
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before
trial or as soon as practicable He has a continuing
duty to make disclosure
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places
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stncted, or deferred, or make such other order as is
appropriate Upon motion by a party, the court may
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or
in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte show
mg, the entire text of the party's statement shall be
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be
made available to the appellate court in the event of
an appeal
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceed
mgs it is brought to the attention of the court that a
party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the ac
cused may be required to
(1) Appear in a lineup,
(2) Speak for identification,
(3) Submit to fingerprinting or the making of
other bodily impressions,
(4) Pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime,
(5) Try on articles of clothing or other items of
disguise,
(6) Permit the taking of samples of blood, hair,
fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials
which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion,
(7) Provide specimens of handwriting,
(8) Submit to reasonable physical or medical
inspection of his body, and
(9) Cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense
Whenever the personal appearance,, of the accused" is required'for ^ e ^ r e ^ o m g j a u r p o s e s , reasonable notice of the timelimljiTace of such appearance~shalll>e g i v e n l o l h e accuseoTandIns c o u n s e l ^
Failure of the accused to appear Or to comply with
the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by
order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall
be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may
be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in
chief for consideration along with other evidence
concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be
subject to such further sanctions as the court
should deem appropriate
i960
77-35-17. Rule 17 — The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel The
defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to
trial in his absence,
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall
have the same effect as if defendant had been
present, and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defen
d f l n t f r o m frrml for anrA
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